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Abstract 
There was an accident to a fighter aircraft.  Investigation revealed that the accident 
was caused due to loss of power in the engine as a result of failure in the main fuel 
pump (MFP). The MFP was multi-plunger type. On dis-assembly, the MFP was found 
severely damaged and there were fractures in one plunger and four springs. Through 
systematic metallurgical investigation and analysis, the sequence of events leading 
to the failure in the MFP was established. The primary failure in the MFP was the 
fatigue fracture of springs. The fatigue crack initiation could be attributed to pitting 
corrosion on the surface of the springs. Because of multiple fractures in one of the 
springs, there was impact load on the corresponding plunger, which resulted in 
generation of an overload crack.  This crack had further propagated progressively by 
fatigue mechanism culminating in fracture and loss of material from the side wall of 
the plunger. Subsequently, there was fuel leakage internally in the MFP with the 
resultant reduction in the fuel delivery pressure. Due to insufficient fuel supply, there 
was winding down of the engine RPM leading to loss of thrust. After establishing the 
sequence of failure in the MFP, investigation was carried out to identify the cause for 
the corrosion on the surface of the springs. It was established that the raw material 
(wires) used for the manufacture of the springs had developed corrosion pits on the 
surface due to improper storage.  
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1. Introduction 
The components in an aeroengine always operate under most arduous 
conditions and the application demands working of the components in 
tandem. Failure in any of the components leads to catastrophe with resultant 
loss of the aircraft and also, loss of valuable lives. Aeroengine being a safety 
critical system, is normally manufactured, serviced and maintained to the 
highest standards. Yet, aircraft accidents do take place due to engine 
failures. Failures in aeroengines are more likely the result of a chain of 
events rather than due to a single cause. Investigation of aeroengine failures 
is, therefore, complex and challenging [1-2].   
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The components of aeroengines are subjected to cyclic loading during their 
operational usage. Because of this, the components experience fatigue 
leading to initiation and propagation of cracks at highly stressed areas. 
Statistics show that fatigue is the predominant mode of failure in aircraft 
components and it accounts for nearly 60% of the total failures [3]. If one 
considers the failures in engine components alone, the percentage of fatigue 
failure is still higher.  
Generally, the components of aeroengines are designed for safe life with the 
minimum probability of fatigue cracking during the life span. In spite of this, 
fatigue failures of the components are common. Fatigue cracks generally 
initiate at locations of high stress concentrations. Study shows that the stress 
concentrators are invariably related to defects of various types, introduced 
mostly inadvertently, at various stages of the life cycle of the components, 
starting from manufacturing to service retirement [4-5].  Stress 
concentration also arises because of corrosion during service due to 
interaction of the components with the operating environment. In these 
cases, the failure generally does not take place due to loss of substantial 
amount of material. Instead, the stress concentration arising from the 
corrosion facilitates premature fatigue crack initiation in the component and 
its eventual failure by fatigue fracture.  
In this paper, investigation of a failure in the main fuel pump of an 
aeroengine has been reported. The failure had resulted in loss of power in 
the engine, leading to an accident. Through systematic investigation and 
analysis, the primary cause of failure in the MFP and the sequence of events 
that led to the accident were established.  
 
2. Information  
A fighter aircraft met with an accident during a practice sortie with parallel 
taxi track overshoot and landing. The pilot had carried out two overshoots 
during the flight of 22 minutes. During the final circuit while on turn, pilot 
suddenly felt loss of thrust and observed winding down of the engine RPM. 
Thereafter, finding no response to the throttle movement, the pilot ejected 
safely and the aircraft crashed onto the ground. Since the aircraft was flying 
at low altitude, the impact was not very severe. Also, there was no post-
accident fire. 
The engine was removed from the aircraft and strip examined.  Most of the 
components of the engine were in good condition. Based on the pilot’s 
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statement and flight data recorder (FDR) analysis, it was decided to carry out 
functional test on the main fuel pump (MFP). During the test, the maximum 
fuel pressure build-up in the pump was recorded to be 15 kg/cm2, which was 
significantly less than the required limit of 100 kg/cm2. On dis-assembly, the 
MFP was found severely damaged.  
 
3. Construction and working of MFP 
Schematic of the MFP is shown in Fig.1. The MFP in the present case is multi-
plunger type and had nine plungers. The plungers are housed in the cavities 
or chambers of the rotor. For facilitating unobstructed up and down 
movement, each plunger is assembled in the rotor chamber with a guide and 
a spring. The plunger heads are crowned and in the assembly, they remain 
flushed with a swash plate. One end of the swash plate is fixed while the 
other end is operated by a servo piston. The angular position of the swash 
plate ensures up and down movement of the plungers when the rotor is on 
rotation. This facilitates the fuel to enter into the plungers and to deliver to 
the respective ports. At the bottom of the rotor, a plate having two kidney 
ports is fixed for the fuel to enter and to exit during each rotation of the 
rotor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of (a) MFP in assembly, and (b) components of MFP 
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4. Observations during dis-assembly of MFP 
After dis-assembly of the swash plate, deep score marks were observed on 
the outer conical surface of the rotor and the corresponding inner surface of 
the pump body casing. It was found that two plungers (at cavity No. 3 and 4) 
were in partially pressed condition and one plunger (at cavity No. 5) was in 
fully pressed condition. The other six plungers were in normal position. 
Examination revealed loss of material from the side wall of the plunger that 
was located at cavity No.3. Later, the fractured part of the plunger was 
recovered from inside the MFP body casing.  
On removal of the plungers from the rotor cavities, four of the springs were 
found to be broken. These springs were located in the cavity Nos. 3,4,6 and 
7. The spring in the cavity No.3 had broken into four pieces while the other 
three have broken into two pieces. In the cavity No.3, the broken parts of 
the spring was found entangled and telescoped in. However, the spring in the 
cavity No. 5 was in tact, where the plunger was found in fully pressed 
condition. All the spring guides were found undamaged.  
 
 
 
 
5. Laboratory Investigation and Test Results 
5.1. Rotor 
The rotor of the MFP is shown in Fig.2(a). Damages were observed on the 
outer conical surface of the rotor encompassing a circular band, and located 
close to the bottom. A dig mark resembling an arc was observed on the face 
of the rotor in the vicinity of cavity No.3 (Fig.2(b)). Also, can be seen is the 
polishing wear on a sector of the inner surface of the cavity No.3 (Fig.2(c)). 
This indicated that the body of the plunger No.3 was preferentially in contact 
with this region of the cavity surface at least for a part of its operation.  
There was no distress on the quill shaft of the rotor. The splines on the shaft 
were found in tact without any damage. Also, there were no evidences which 
could be suggestive of misalignment in the assembly.  
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Figure 2: (a) Rotor of the MFP; cavity No. indicated, (b) dig mark resembling an arc on the 
surface facing the swash plate, and (c) polishing wear on the inner surface of the cavity No.3 
 
 
 
5.2. Body casing 
Figure 3(a) shows the body casing of the MFP. It was found to be in tact 
except for the damages on the inner surface over a circumferential band 
(Fig.3(b)). Similar damages were observed on the corresponding location on 
the conical surface of the rotor (Fig.2(a) and Fig.3(c)). It can be seen that 
the damages were caused due to churning of hard debris during rotation of 
the rotor. Numerous dig marks, resembling the shape of arcs, indicated that 
at least one fragment in the debris was sufficiently large.  The fragment was 
part of a curved surface with circular cross section and it appeared to be the 
fractured part of the plunger No.3, which was recovered from the body 
casing of the MFP during dis-assembly.  
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Figure 3: (a) Body casing of MFP, (b) damages on the inner surface of the casing, and (c) 
damages on the outer conical surface of the rotor in the corresponding region  
 
 
5.3. Plungers 
One of the nine plungers of the MFP was found to have a hole on the side 
wall due to loss of material by fracture (refer Fig.4). This plunger was located 
in the cavity No.3 of the rotor. A fragment, approximately of circular shape 
and having a diameter of about 9 mm, got separated from the plunger side 
wall at a location close to the crown (Fig.5). The fracture surface on this 
fragment was found damaged and it was smeared with material rich in Cu 
and Al, picked up from the rotor (made of Cu-alloy) and the body casing 
(made of Al-alloy).  
Examination of the plunger No.3 showed presence of beach marks or crack 
arrest marks on the fracture surface, indicative of progressive mode of crack 
propagation (Fig.6). From the orientation of the beach marks, the fatigue 
crack initiation site was identified at the region marked ‘B’ in Fig.6(c).   After 
initiation, the fatigue crack had propagated progressively over the region 
BCDE before giving way to final overload fracture (region EA in Fig.6(c)) 
resulting in dislodgement of a fragment from the plunger side wall. The gross 
fractographic features in the region AB indicated that this surface was 
created by fast fracture. Examination also revealed that the fracture surface 
AB was the extension of a through thickness longitudinal crack that was 
present over the entire length of the plunger (Fig.6(b,d)).  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
40 mm 
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Figure 4: Nine plungers of the main fuel pump and fracture in the side wall of plunger No.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Fractured and dislodged part of MFP plunger No.3: (a) inner surface, and (b) outer 
surface  
 
Suitable cut was provided in the plunger and the longitudinal crack surface 
was opened for further study (Fig.7). Examination revealed that the 
longitudinal crack on the plunger had three distinct zones, two fast fracture 
regions separated by a region of fatigue fracture (Fig.7(b)). Based on the 
orientation of the crack arrest marks, the crack initiation region and the crack 
propagation direction were identified, and these are shown in Fig.7(f).  
The modes of crack propagation at different regions on the plunger were 
confirmed through scanning electron fractographic study. Fatigue striations 
and dimples were seen on the progressive crack propagation zones and fast 
fracture regions, respectively (Fig.8).  
No.1 No.9 No.3 
(a) (b) 
1.6 mm 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: (a) Plunger No.3, (b) crack along the longitudinal direction (black arrows), (c) 
fracture surface showing fatigue crack origin, encircled (B), progressive crack propagation 
direction over region BCDE (white arrows) and overload fracture in regions EA and AB (black 
arrows), and (d) extension of the crack shown in (b) up to the bottom edge of the plunger  
 
Fractographic study suggested that there was generation of an overload 
crack at the bottom edge of the plunger, which subsequently propagated by 
fatigue mechanism. Examination of this region showed impact damages on 
the tapered inner surface (Fig.9(a)). These damages were observed only on 
the plunger No.3 and the other eight plungers were found free from any such 
damages (Fig.9(b)).   
Observations did not reveal any distress on the outer surface of the plungers. 
There were no wear tracks in the longitudinal direction of the surface and 
hence, possibility of fuel contamination with hard particles was ruled out. The 
wear on the crown surface of the plungers was also found to be minimal and 
normal. Minor polishing marks were noticed on the surface of all the plungers 
at the mid-length region covering about one-third of the length. Such 
polishing wear is normal and generally occurs due to rotation of the plungers 
during pump operation.  
The material of construction of the plunger was evaluated and it conformed 
to the specification in respect of chemical composition (Table 1), 
microstructure (Fig.10) and hardness (62 HRC). 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
5 mm 
2 mm 
 9 
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) (f) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: (a-b) Three distinct fracture regions along the longitudinal crack on plunger No.3, 
(c) fast fracture in region C, (d) transition of fatigue to fast mode of crack propagation from 
region B to A, (e) transition from fast fracture to fatigue mode of crack propagation from 
region C to B, and (f) crack initiation and propagation along the longitudinal direction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Scanning electron fractographs: (a-c) fatigue mode of crack propagation in region 
BCDE marked in Fig. 6(c), and (d) fast fracture, (e) fatigue fracture, and (f) fast fracture in 
regions A, B and C respectively marked in Fig. 7(b) 
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Figure 9: Inner surface of (a) plunger No.3, and (b) plunger No.1; damages on the taper 
surface of plunger No.3 encircled  
 
Table 1: Chemical compositional of plunger material; carried out by optical emission 
spectroscopy 
Composition, wt% 
Element Specification Plunger No.3 
C 
Mn 
Si 
Cr 
Mo 
V 
Fe 
1.45-1.65 
0.15-0.40 
0.15-0.35 
11.00-12.50 
0.40-0.60 
0.15-0.30 
Balance 
1.58 
0.27 
0.31 
11.35 
0.49 
0.26 
Balance 
 
5.4. Springs 
The springs of the plunger Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 were found fractured. Spring 
No. 3 had fractured into four pieces, while the other three springs had 
fractured into two pieces each (Fig.11).  
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Figure 10: Optical microstructures of the plunger material showing satisfactory tempered 
martensitic structure dispersed with carbide particles: (a) longitudinal section, and (b) cross 
section (etched with 2% Nital solution) 
 
The four fractured parts of the spring No. 3 are shown in Fig.12. The 
fractured part B was found entangled in the fractured part C. Examination of 
the faces of each of the fractured parts of the spring showed that the faces 
corresponding to fracture 1 had deformed/flattened to a large extent. The 
damages on the faces of the other fractured parts were found to be relatively 
less. This indicates that fracture 1 was the first in the sequence of 
occurrence, followed by which the other two fractures had occurred.  
The spring ends corresponding to the fracture 1 were found damaged/ 
rubbed substantially resulting in complete obliteration of the fractographic 
features. The other fracture ends of the spring were found relatively 
preserved. These fractures were found to be oriented approximately at 450 
with the wire axis of the spring. Examination revealed that the fracture 
surfaces were flat and smooth in appearance, indicative of progressive mode 
of crack propagation.  
Figures 13 and 14 show the scanning electron fractographs of the broken 
ends corresponding to the fractures 2 and 3 respectively. The fracture 
surfaces showed clearly delineated half-moon shaped region consisting of 
beach marks or crack arrest marks, typical of fatigue mode of crack 
propagation. From the orientation of the beach marks, the fatigue crack 
origins were identified and they were found to be corrosion pits on the spring 
surface. Further examination showed presence of numerous corrosion pits on 
the surface of the spring (Fig.15). Compositional analysis showed that 
corrosion products in these pits contained corrosion species such as chlorine 
(Table 2).  
40 m 100 m 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 11: Fractured springs of the MFP; the locations of the springs in the corresponding 
plungers indicated  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Fractures in spring No.3 showing relative damages on the faces of the broken 
parts  
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Figure 13: Scanning electron fractographs of one of the mating surfaces of fracture 2 of 
spring No.3: (a) fracture surface oriented approximately 450 with the wire axis (arrow), (b) 
crack arrest marks or beach marks, (c) fatigue crack origin region, (d) dimple rupture, (e) 
fatigue striations, and (f) corrosion pits at the fatigue crack origin (encircled) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Scanning electron fractographs of one of the mating surfaces of fracture 3 of 
spring No.3: (a) fracture surface oriented approximately 450 with the wire axis (arrow), (b) 
crack arrest marks or beach marks, (c) magnified view showing concentric crack arrest marks, 
(d) fatigue crack origin (rectangular box), (e) corrosion pits at the fatigue crack origin, and (f) 
fatigue striations 
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) (f) 
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) (f) 
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Fractographic study confirmed that the fractures in springs 4, 6 and 7 were 
also by fatigue mechanism. The crack origin regions in these springs were 
largely damaged and hence, no further study could be conducted. However, 
corrosion pits were observed on the surfaces of these springs as well (Fig.16 
and Table 2).  
The material of construction of the springs conformed to the specification in 
terms of chemical composition (Table 3), microstructure (Fig.17), and 
hardness (50-52 HRC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: (a) Scanning electron images of the surface of the broken spring No.3 showing 
corrosion pits, and (b) optical micrographs of the longitudinal section of the spring wire 
showing corrosion on the surface (encircled) 
 
5.5. Analysis of fuel samples 
Fuel samples were collected from the main fuel pump and the fuel oil unit 
and they were subjected to evaluation. Analysis showed that the fuel quality 
conformed to the specification and did not contain chlorine. The sulphur 
content was within permissible limit. 
(a) 
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Figure 16: Scanning electron images of the surface of the broken spring No.6 showing 
corrosion pits (encircled) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Optical microstructures of No.3 spring of the fuel pump showing satisfactory 
tempered martensitic structure: (a) longitudinal section, typical of cold drawn wire, and (b) 
cross section (etched with 2% Nital solution) 
 
 
5.6. Raw material of springs and unused springs 
The raw material wire and the unused springs from the same batch of 
production as the fractured ones were evaluated. Examination revealed 
corrosion on the surfaces of the raw material as well as the springs (Fig.18). 
Compositional analysis showed presence of chlorine in the corrosion products 
(Table 2).   
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
40 m 40 m 
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Figure 18: Scanning electron images showing corrosion on the surfaces of the (a) raw 
material wire, and (b) an unused spring 
 
Table 2: Semi-quantitative composition analysis of the corrosion products; carried out by 
energy dispersive X-ray analysis 
Element 
Composition, wt% 
Fatigue crack origins Spring surface Raw material 
(Fig.18(a)) 
 Fig.13(f) Fig.14(e) Fig.15(a) Fig.16 Fig.18(b) 
O 
Al 
Si 
Cl 
Ti 
Cr 
Mn 
Fe 
38.4 
0.6 
1.1 
0.3 
0.8 
0.2 
0.8 
Balance 
26.8 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
0.3 
3.0 
0.9 
Balance 
21.4 
0.8 
0.9 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
1.3 
Balance 
27.7 
0.5 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
1.2 
Balance 
33.7 
0.8 
0.9 
0.6 
0.2 
0.3 
1.5 
Balance 
26.9 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.2 
0.3 
1.1 
Balance 
 
 
Table 3: Chemical composition of spring material; carried out by optical emission 
spectroscopy 
Composition, wt% 
Element Specification 
Springs of MFP 
Unused 3 4 6 7 
C 
Si 
Mn 
Cr 
V 
Ni 
Fe 
0.47-0.55 
0.15-0.30 
0.3-0.6 
0.75-1.1 
0.15-0.25 
 0.3 
Balance 
0.49 
0.31 
0.54 
0.98 
0.21 
0.23 
Balance 
0.52 
0.33 
0.58 
1.11 
0.23 
0.20 
Balance 
0.50 
0.30 
0.48 
0.89 
0.19 
0.17 
Balance 
0.54 
0.29 
0.47 
1.06 
0.18 
0.27 
Balance 
0.48 
0.27 
0.51 
1.01 
0.28 
0.28 
Balance 
 
(a) (b) 
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6. Analysis  
6.1. Failure in the engine 
Fractographic study confirmed that plunger No.3 of MFP has failed in 
progressive manner leading to dislodgement of a piece of material from the 
side wall of the plunger close to the crown. The resultant hole in the plunger 
was responsible for fuel leakage internally in the MFP, which in turn 
prevented generation of fuel pressure to the required level. As a 
consequence, there was less fuel delivery to the engine leading to winding 
down of engine RPM and subsequent accident.   
 
6.2. Failure in the MFP 
It has been established through fractographic study that the fatigue failure in 
plunger No.3 was promoted due to generation of an overload crack in the 
longitudinal direction over a length of about 22 mm from the bottom edge. 
Such longitudinal cracking of the plunger due to hoop-stress is unlikely under 
the operating fuel pressure. It, therefore, appears that there was abnormal 
loading on the edge of the plunger through the spring and the guide located 
inside.  
Examination of the inner surface of the plunger at the overload crack origin 
region showed distress in the form of rubbing with the spring. The rubbing 
took place in regions where the inner surface of the plunger surface is 
tapered outward. The rubbing marks were found to be unique to plunger 
No.3 and the other plungers were found to be free from such damages. It is 
to be noted that the spring of the plunger No.3 had broken into four pieces. 
Therefore, the contact of the spring with the tapered surface of the plunger 
was possible because of this breakage. 
Laboratory investigation showed that all the fractures in spring No.3 were by 
fatigue mechanism. It was also established that the premature fatigue 
fracture of the spring was promoted due to corrosion on the spring surface.  
In the sequence of failure, the spring No.3 had fractured by fatigue leading to 
a situation wherein the parts of the spring were either misaligned or 
telescoped in. This had resulted in impact load on the plunger at the bottom 
edge leading to generation of an overload crack of length 22 mm. This crack 
had then propagated further by fatigue over a length of about 20 mm. 
Followed by which, the crack had again propagated by overload and got 
arrested at the top inner surface of the plunger. The crack edge at the top 
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surface had then propagated by fatigue following roughly a circular path 
leading to dislodgement of material from a sector of the side wall of the 
plunger. Following this, the dislodged fragment had fallen in the annular 
space between the rotor and the pump body casing. The churning of this 
fragment during operation of the pump had damaged the outer conical 
surface of the rotor and the inner surface of the pump body casing over a 
circular band.  
Therefore, the primary reason for the failure of plunger No.3 of the MFP was 
the fatigue fracture of the spring. The fatigue fracture of the spring was 
promoted due to corrosion. The failure of the springs 4, 6 and 7 was also by 
fatigue because of the same reason. Evidences suggest that the failure in 
spring 3 was the first among the four spring failures. Also, failures in the four 
springs were independent of each other and had occurred at different times.  
Metallurgical evaluation of the plunger and spring materials showed that they 
conformed to their respective specifications. Hence, no deficiency in the 
material of construction was responsible for the fatigue crack initiation. The 
results of the fuel analysis suggested that there was no contamination which 
could result in corrosion on the surface of the MFP springs.  
 
6.3. Primary cause of failure 
Follow-up investigation revealed corrosion on the surface of the raw material 
wire that was used for the fabrication of the springs. Same observations were 
also made on the surface of the springs belonging to the same batch of 
production. On examination of the records, it was found that the raw material 
wires were procured at least 12-15 years ago, and they were kept in bonded 
stores without proper surface protection. The interaction of the virgin 
material with the atmosphere for a prolonged period was responsible for the 
development of corrosion pits on the surface of the wires. The same defects 
got carried forward when the springs were fabricated from these wires.  
Therefore, the primary reason for the failure was the improper storage of raw 
material wires used for the fabrication of MFP springs.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 (a) Investigation showed that the winding down of the engine RPM was due 
to failure in the MFP. The failure was progressive in nature. 
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(b) Four springs in the MFP had failed by fatigue. The premature fatigue 
failure in these springs was promoted due to corrosion on the springs’ 
surface. The failure of spring No.3 had resulted in progressive failure of 
the corresponding plunger leading to separation of a piece from the side 
wall of the plunger. As a result, there was fuel leakage internally in the 
MFP. This in turn, prevented generation of fuel pressure to the required 
level with the consequence of less fuel delivery to the engine.   
(c) The corrosion pits on the springs of the MFP were not developed during 
usage. Instead, it was carried forward from the raw material stage. It 
was established that there was development of corrosion pits on the 
surface of the raw material wires during storage. Therefore, the primary 
reason for the spring failure was the improper storage of the raw 
material for a long period of time without proper surface protection.  
 
8. Recommendations 
(a) It is recommended that the springs of the production batch in question 
be rejected. Also, MFPs which have been assembled using springs from 
this batch be withdrawn from service and the springs be replaced.  
(c) The surface condition of the available raw material must be evaluated. 
In case corrosion pits are observed, the wires must be rejected.   
(b) Appropriate procedure should be followed for surface protection of the 
raw material wire as well as the manufactured springs that are kept in 
the bonded stores.  
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